We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.
Introduction
In many allocation problems, the general properties of decentralized information structures, that is what agents know about each other, are exploited in the construction of decision procedures or contracts. The purpose is to achieve an optimal allocation of resources, despite market failures due to externalities or to public goods, and despite strategic behavior, free-riding and misrepresentation of preferences.
1 In the transferable utility case, and for dominant strategy mechanisms, Green and Laffont (1979) and Walker (1980) have shown that it is impossible to balance the budget. On the other hand, as is by now well known, in Bayesian frameworks where the structure of agents beliefs is explicitly taken into account, one can find Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (BIC mechanisms) that balance the budget.
2
The main purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship of a number of conditions on beliefs that have been presented in the literature and shown to guarantee the existence of BIC-mechanisms that implement efficient decision rules with balanced transfers 3 . This clarification is based on a new condition, condition C, that is less restrictive than previous ones (and for most of them strictly less restrictive). This condition is easy to verify and to interpret, certainly easier than the already existing equivalent conditions, namely condition C * introduced 4 by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) and LINK introduced by Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) .
Condition C has an an important consequence: it "guarantees budget 1 The first applications belonged to public economics and to the study of collective decision making and auctions (see Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) ), but there are many other applications. In auctions, rather than maximizing the profit of the seller as in Myerson (1981) , Milgrom and Weber (1982) or McLean (1985, 1988) , one can try to find efficient bilateral or multilateral trading mechanisms (Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) , Wilson (1985) , Leininger, Linehart and Radner (1989) , Satterwhaite and Williams, (1989) ). Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) have studied the related problem of reallocating efficiently the shares of an asset.
2 See among others, d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1975 , 1979 , d'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard- Varet (1990) , Arrow (1979) , Laffont and Maskin (1979) , Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) and Matsushima (1990) .
3 Here we mean balancing the budget ex post (for all states of the world). That no condition is required to balance the budget ex ante is a known fact (see d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1982, theorem 9) . 4 It was introduced as condition C (without a star) but can be shown equivalent to our new condition (that we will also call condition C) by a simple duality argument. It is very close in formulation to the compatibility condition of d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) , and for that reason sometimes called by the same name. But it was shown to be strictly weaker by Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) . Through a counterexample, Chung (1999) shows that Matsushima (1991) regularity condition does not imply the compatibility condition. However, as we shall prove, it does imply condition C balance", in the sense that it ensures that any BIC-mechanism can be transformed into a BIC-mechanism that balances the budget. Since for efficient decision rules, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are BIC-mechanisms and always exist, it is clear that when condition C holds it is possible to build a balanced budget BIC mechanism. Other authors have presented conditions that guarantee budget balance (see pairwise identifiability introduced by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994, 1995) as well as Assumption I(i) of in Aoyagi (1998), rebaptized weak regularity by Chung (1999)). Because, as we show, condition C is both necessary and sufficient for an information structure to guarantee budget balance, it is less restrictive that these other conditions, and, through examples, we show that it is strictly less restrictive.
In the final section of the paper, we study stronger conditions that guarantee that all decision rules, even those that are not efficient, can be implemented while balancing the budget, a property that might be useful in many specific problems (typically those involving only a subset of all agents). We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this property is the already known 5 condition B and that it is a weaker condition than the strict regularity condition of Aoyagi (1998) . Finally, we show that the mechanisms can easily be constructed through a "scoring rules" method. We also show that, loosely speaking, the class of beliefs satisfying condition C can be partitioned into those that satisfy condition B and those that satisfy a (very weak) independence property.
After writing down the problem in section 2, we review in section 3 conditions that guarantee that, through the design of appropriate transfers, decision rules can be implemented when they are efficient. In section 4, we turn to the study of conditions that guarantee the same result for all decision rules. Finally, the conclusion, section 5, discusses some of the issues left open by the results presented in the paper.
The range of applications of the problems that fit within the framework of this paper is quite large; it includes optimal cartel agreements 6 , agreements between firms and their suppliers 7 , the internal organization of firms 8 , R&D contracting 9 , and pollution control at the national and international level 10 . Furthermore the more theoretical literature on the core solution concept in cooperative games of incomplete information 11 use balanced Bayesian mechanisms to represent the bargaining that takes place within coalitions. We will comment on some of these applications at the relevant point in the paper.
Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
We consider a set N of n ≥ 3 agents 12 . All the private information of agent i ∈ N is represented by his type α i which belongs to a finite set (with at least two elements) A i . An n-vector of possible types is denoted α and is an element of A = i∈N A i .
The utility function of agent i of type α i is defined over a set X of public decisions, and utility is "transferable": for x ∈ X and a monetary transfer t i ∈ , his utility is u i (x; α i ) + t i . Some of our results hold when utility functions have the more general form u i (x; α) + t i , i.e. they are mutually payoff-relevant in the terminology of Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) . The pair (X , {u i } i∈N ) is called a payoff structure.
The type of agent i also determines his beliefs about the types of the other agents. When he is of type α i they are represented by a probability distribution over A −i = j∈N −i A j , the set of the possible types of the other agents. A generic element of A −i will be denoted α −i ; we will sometimes use the notation α −i−j ∈ A −i−j to denote a vector of possible types of all agents but i and j.
There exists a probability distribution p over A such that the beliefs p(α −i | α i ) of agent i of type α i are obtained by conditioning p with respect to α i (the beliefs are "consistent"), and we assume that p(α i ) > 0 for all i and all α i . Similarly, for i = j, the beliefs of agent i on the types of agents over than himself or j are p (
An environment is composed of a payoff structure and an information struture.
A public decision rule s is a function from A into X : for a vector α of types the public decision
The problem is to implement a decision rule s when the decision mechanism must be based on private information revealed by the agents. Invoking the revelation principle 13 , we restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms in which agents are induced to truthfully reveal their type to the planner; such a direct mechanism is defined by a decision rule s : A → X and a transfer rule t : A → n . We will say that an information structure (N , A, p) guarantees implementation of efficient public decision rules if for every payoff structure 14 (X , {u i } i∈N ) and any efficient decision rule s we can find a transfer rule t which balances the budget, i.e., that satisfies i∈N t i (α) = 0 for all α ∈ A, and such that the associated direct mechanism (s, t) satisfies the Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) constraints
(1)
for all i ∈ N , and all α i and α i ∈ A. Strict implementation is obtained when all (BIC)-inequalities hold strictly 15 . If, in the preceding definition, "any efficient decision rule" is replaced by "any decision rule", the information structure guarantees implementation of all decision rules.
In this framework, most effort in the literature has been devoted to finding information structures that guarantee implementation of efficient public decision rules with no additional restriction on the payoff structure. The conditions that are obtained are usually easier to verify and to interpret than those who bear jointly on utility functions and on information structures 16 , and they lead to techniques for building mechanisms. From a more fundamental viewpoint, it is important to understand when asymmetry of information constrains the set of allocations that can be obtained; it seems reasonable to focus on properties of the information stuctures that make it feasible to implement different categories of decision rules. For instance, some information about the independence of types of agents might be given, and it is important to understand what are the consequences of this independence.
14 Because we have only a finite set of types, only a finite subset of alternatives are really relevant. The fact that the set X varies does not create any difficulty, and we could keep it fixed without changing the results if its cardinality was equal to that of A.
15 Notice that we have imposed no uniqueness of equilibrium requirement. In d'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1999), we show how equivalent mechanims with a single equilibrium can be constructed in nearly all environments.
16 A necessary and sufficient condition bearing both on the beliefs and the utility functions is given by lemma 1 in d 'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1990) . For more interpretable conditions that bear jointly on utility functions and information structures see Bensaid (1986) and Duggan and Roberts (1999) .
In our formal development, we introduce no individual rationality constraint. However, all our results hold true if we add an ex-ante individual rationality constraint of the form
≥ 0, as long as there is a status quo decision that guarantees each agent a utility of 0. This is appropriate for many applications in which the contract is signed before the agents acquire information about their types. For instance, Duggan and Roberts (1999) and Bial, Houser and Libecap (2000) use this model to study agreements to reduce pollution. Riordan (1983 Riordan ( , 1984 and Crémer and Riordan (1987) consider a firm that contracts with suppliers for a new project in which the different firms have imperfect but symmetric knowledge ex-ante, but acquire proprietary knowledge as the project is developped. The same dynamic of information acquisition occurs in joint research ventures: see Bhattacharya, Glazer and Sappington (1992) and d'Aspremont, Bhattacharya and Gérard-Varet (1998).
Conditions that guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules
In the literature, many conditions have been introduced to guarantee implementation of efficient public decision rules. We will review them, but we start by introducing a condition that will turn out to be weaker than all others, and that we call condition C because a simple duality argument shows it to be equivalent to a condition introduced by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) to which we shall refer as condition 17 C * . It simply states that beliefs are such that we can collect from the agents any aggregate transfer, dependent on the state of nature, without inciting them to lie.
Condition C
We will say that an information structure satisfies condition C if and only if for every function R : A → , there exists a transfer rule t C such that for
for λ : A i × A i → + and κ : A → , then κ must be identically zero. To obtain the compatibility condition just replace each λ i (α i ,α i ) by λ i (α i ,α i ) on the left hand side of the equalities. The argument of Matsushima (1991, Appendix) is correct for condition C * , not for the compatibility condition (see Chung, 1999) .
and such that for all i ∈ N and all α i and α i in A i , α i = α i , we have:
It is easy to show that condition C is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that any BIC-mechanism can be modified into a BIC-mechanism that balance the budget 18 . To state this formally, we will say that an information structure guarantees budget balance if, given any payoff structure, and for any BIC-mechanism (s, t), there exists another transfer rule t that balances the budget and such that (s, t ) is also a BIC-mechanism.
Lemma 1 An information structure guarantees budget balance if and only if it satisfies condition C.
Proof. Given some payoff structure, consider an information structure (N , A, p) that satisfies condition C and a BIC-mechanism (s, t). Let R = − i∈N t i . By condition C, there exists a transfer rule t C that satisfies equations (2) and (3). It is immediate that the transfer rule t = t + t C balances the budget and provides the correct incentives.
To show the reverse implication, consider an information structure (N , A, p) that guarantees budget balance. Choose any function R : A −→ . Pick a payoff structure and a decision rule s such that u i (s(α); α i ) = R(α)/n for all α and all α i . It is easy to verify that if we set t i (α) = −R(α)/n for all α, the inequalities (BIC) hold (with both sides being equal to each other).
Because budget balance is guaranteed, there exists a transfer function t that satisfies (1) (with t replaced by t) for all α, all α i and all i, as well as
satisfy (2) and (3), which proves the result 19 .
18 In Johnson, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1990) , this is established (Proposition 5.4), for condition C * , but the argument is more intricate. Their proposition is of course another way to prove the equivalence between C and C * . 19 It is clear that, with the definitions modified accordingly, this result holds for mutually payoff-relevant utility functions. This is not true for the following theorem, which relies on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
Lemma 1 yields an immediate proof of the following theorem 20 .
Theorem 2 Any information structure that satisfies condition C guarantees implementation of efficient decision rules.
Proof. Consider any payoff structure (X , {u i } i∈N ) and any efficient decision rule s. The (BIC) constraints can be satisfied using transfers of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves type, i.e., t G i (α) = j =i u j (s(α); α j ), since, as well known, these transfers implement any efficient decision rule in dominant strategies:
The result follows from lemma 1.
Verifying that condition C holds looks like a formidable task, because the system of equations (2) and (3) has to be solved for any function R. As a matter of fact, it is sufficient to show that it can be solved for a finite number of functionsR, those which for some α satisfy R (α ) = 1 for some α ∈ A andR(α) = 0 for all α = α . Indeed any function R : A −→ is a positive linear combination of these functionsR, and one can use the same linear combination of the corresponding transfer functions to obtain a transfer function that satisfies equations (2) and (3). Finally, we recall that, as shown by d'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1990), condition C holds for nearly all 21 information structures.
Other conditions
As known since d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1975) and Arrow (1979) , guaranteeing implementation of any efficient decision rule can be obtained by assuming some form of independence of types. Formally, an agent i is said to have free beliefs on a pair
. Agent i has free beliefs if he has free beliefs on all pairs of types. Independence of types holds when all agents have free beliefs. It is well
20 This result was first proved for the "compatibilty condition" in d'Aspremont and Gérard- Varet (1979) and for condition C * in d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) . The present proof is much more immediate.
21 By "nearly all" we mean on an open and dense subset of the set of probalility distributions (which is itself a subset of K , where K = i∈N #A i and #A i is the cardinality of A i .).
known that independence of types implies that condition C holds.
22 Crémer and Riordan (1985) show that if one agent has free beliefs, it is possible to implement efficient decision rules.
Interestingly, the three other conditions introduced in the literature and shown to guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules limit in some ways the degree of independence between the types.
The first of these conditions is Matsushima's (1991) regularity condition, which holds if there exists a pair of agents (i, j) such that the vectors {p(α −i−j | α i )} α −i−j ∈A −i−j are linearly independent (note that, for a given pair (i, j), the dimension of these vectors is equal to the cardinality of the set A −i−j , and their number is equal to the cardinality of A i ).
Later, Chung (1999) analyzed a weak regularity condition, which is equivalent to Assumption I(i) in Aoyagi (1998). It holds if there exists a pair of agents (i, j) such that for all pairs (
Finally, Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994, 1995) introduced the pairwise identifiability condition. For any i ∈ N , any α ∈ A, and a "deviation" a i (a i ) (a deviation is a function from A i into itself) let
is indexed both by the set of deviations and A). Finally, let
An information structure satisfies pairwise identifiability if rank Π ij = rank Π i + rank Π j −1 for every pair of agents (i, j): deviations from truth telling by two agents generate sufficiently different probability distributions on the n-tuple of reports that a deviating agent can be identified.
Relationship between the different conditions
As the following theorem shows, condition C is more general than all the three conditions discussed in 3.2.
Theorem 3 An information structure (N, A, p) satisfies condition C if any of the following conditions hold: (i) at least one agent has free beliefs, (ii) weak regularity (or regularity) is satisfied, (iii) pairwise identifiability is satisfied.
Furthermore condition C is strictly less restrictive than these three conditions.
Proof. (i)
If an agent i has free beliefs, say p(α −i ), we can easily construct transfers to satisfy the equalities and inequalities defining C: for any R, let
and, for all j = i, let
However, condition C can hold even when no agent has free beliefs; indeed, condition B introduced below requires that there is no free beliefs and implies condition C.
(ii) As proved by Aoyagi (1998), weak regularity (which is obviously implied by regularity) guarantees budget balance, and therefore implies condition C (by our lemma 1). Furthermore, weak regularity is clearly more restrictive, since it is incompatible with independence of types, which also implies C.
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(iii) Furthermore, lemma 1 in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1995) shows that pairwise identifiability guarantees budget balance. Hence it implies condition C. To show that C is strictly less restrictive, consider the following example. Let {N , A, q} be an information structure, and for i = 1, 2, let
Assume that the rank of the matrix
is strictly smaller than rank Q 1 + rank Q 2 − 1, so that q does not satisfy pairwise identifiability 24 . Add now an agent 0, so that we have a new information structure {N ∪ {0}, A × A 0 , p}, with p (α −0 , α 0 ) ≡ q(α −0 )r(α 0 ), 23 Section 4 shows further that weak regularity is stronger than C and no independence of types.
24 Such information structures exist. Indeed, d 'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1995) show that there exist information structures that do not guarantee implementability of efficient decision rules.
where r is a probability distribution over A 0 . Defining the matrices Π 1 and Π 2 as in 3.2, it is straigthforward that rank Π 1 = rank Q 1 , rank Π 2 = rank Q 2 and rank Π 12 = rank Q 12 . This implies that p does not satisfy pairwise identifiability, but it does satisfy condition C, since agent 0 has free beliefs.
Conditions guaranteeing implementation of all decision rules
Sometimes a mechanism designer does not only try to maximize the interests of the participants in a mechanism; this will happen, for instance, if the participants in the mechanisms are representatives of the agents whose welfare the mechanism designer cares about, and if the incentives of the representatives are not perfectly aligned with the welfare of the agents. In these cases the decision rule to be implemented is not efficient in the sense which we have given to the term in section 2. In order to study this problem, we will use another condition, called condition B, which was introduced by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1982) . It assumes that there exists a balanced tranfer rule t B such that for all i ∈ N and all α i and α i in A i , α i = α i we have:
Condition B is important because of the following theorem (which remains valid in the mutually payoff-relevant case).
Theorem 4 Condition B is necessary and sufficient for an information structure to guarantee the implementation
25 of all decision rules.
Proof.
It is straightforward to show that condition B is sufficient: for any environment one can multiply the transfers t B i by a sufficiently large positive number to ensure that the incentives for truthtelling derived from (4) dominate any incentives from misrepresentation stemming from the desire to change the public decision.
26
25 Note that theorem 4 also holds if "implementation" is replaced by "strict implementation".
26 This technique used here is similar to the techniques used by McLean (1985, 1988) , in the case of auctions. The mechanism designer convinces the agents to announce their true types by making them "bet" on the announcements of the others. This can only yield truthful revelation when the agents' beliefs about the others depend on their own types.
We now show if an information structure (N , A, p) 
for all α i = α 0 i , and Theorem 4 provides a characterization of the set of information structures in which asymmetry of information does not restrict the implementation of public decisions. When an information structure does not satisfy condition B, a mechanism designer will know that he must rely on properties of the information structure and of the utility functions (such as knowing that the decision rule is efficient). Theorem 4 also has a constructive side: its sufficiency part provides a method for building BIC mechanisms.
28 .
27 It is possible to find an environment exists where such a decision rule exists. Choose
x ∈ X and all α j . We are implementing a decision rule that minimizes the sum of the utilities of the agents! 28 In some cases, these mechanisms might have unpleasant properties as they could require large side payments; then, other techniques for finding mechanisms could be used (but in some circumstances, as for instance when the information structure is close to the boundary of the set where implementation of all decision rules is guaranteed, all the difficulties would be unavoidable).
It is easy to see that condition B is incompatible with free beliefs, which would imply that the two sides of equation (4) are equal. But condition B is not simply a condition on the absence of free beliefs as there exist information structures where no agent has free beliefs, and which do not satisfy condition B (see d 'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet, 1995) . On the other hand, Aoyagi (1998) proposes a strict regularity condition adding to weak regularity the requirement that no agent has free beliefs on any two types. He shows that this condition guarantees implementation of all decision rules.
More precisely, the relationship between free beliefs, condition B, condition C and the strict regularity condition is summarized in the following theorem. In the proof, to construct the transfers t B i , we will use the "scoring rules" method introduced by Good (1952) , discussed by Savage (1974) , and applied to Bayesian implementation by Johnson et al. (1990) .
Theorem 5 An information structure (N , A, p) satisfies condition B if and only if it satisfies condition C and there exists no agent with free beliefs on any two of his types.
The strict regularity condition is strictly more restrictive than condition B.
Proof. It is obvious from their definitions that if an information structure satisfies B, then it also satisfies C, and we have already noticed that B is incompatible with free beliefs. The "only if" part of the first statement of the theorem is therefore proved, and we turn to the "if" part.
Assume that (N , A, p) satisfies C and that no agent has free beliefs on two types. Inspired by the scoring rule literature, Johnson et al. (1990) show that if we take ε small enough and define the transfer rule θ by
, then the following strict inequalities are easily verified due to the strict concavity of the function log
Because the information structure satisfies C, there exists a transfer rule t C satisfying equations (2) and (3). For all α, let t Theorem 1 in Aoyagi (1998) shows that strict regularity of (N , A, p) guarantees implementation of any public decision rule. Hence, by theorem 4, it satisfies condition B. To show that it is strictly more restrictive than B, consider the following information structure (N , A, p) . We have N = {1, 2, 3} and A i = {1, 2, 3} for all i. Let p be equal to 0 if and only if exactly two of the agents have a type equal to either 1 or 3; for all other states of nature let p equal 1/15 (so that p(1, 1, 2) = p(3, 1, 3) = 0 but p(1, 1, 1) = p(1, 3, 2) = 1/15). This information structure is symmetric in the agents and in the types 1 and 3 for each agent. For all i we have
which contradicts weak regularity. To show that condition B holds, define the transfer rule t B as follows:
All other transfers are constructed by permutations on the agents (for example: t B (2, 1, 3) = (−2, 1, 1)). The transfer rule t B is clearly balanced and may be checked to satisfy equation (4). The result follows 29 .
The "scoring rule" used in the theorem suggests an easy technique to construct more generally the transfer rule t B ensuring condition B. Consider an information structure (N , A, p) and let addition and subtraction on the indices of agents be defined modulo n so that n + 1 ≡ 1 and 1 − 1 ≡ n. For all i, all α i , and all α i , we assume (and this holds generically The negative terms are constant in α i and do not influence the incentives of agent i, but they ensure that the rule is balanced. The strict concavity of the function log implies that for all i and all α i , inequality (4) holds, and therefore that condition B is satisfied.
29 It is important to remark that the results would still hold true if the 0 probabilities in the information structure where replaced by a small enough ε, adapting the other probabilities accordingly.
30 Genericity has been demonstrated before, not only for condition C * , as already mentioned, but also for pairwise identifiability (see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1995) ) and for strict regularity (see Aoyagi (1998) ). Of course, it cannot hold for free beliefs.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to bring some clarifications. We have introduced condition C as an easily interpretable condition that guarantees implementability of efficient decision rules. It is more general than all the other conditions to the same effect presented in the literature. Condition B, which is necessary and sufficient for implementability of all decision rules, is equivalent to condition C plus the absence of free beliefs.
Of course this leaves unanswered some questions, some of which we tackle in d 'Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (1995) . For instance, given that condition C is more general than all the other conditions, is it in fact necessary and sufficient for the implementability of all efficient decision rules? The answer to this question is negative, as there exist information structures that guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules but do not satisfy condition C. Given this result, one can wonder if the implementation of efficient decision rules is not actually guaranteed in all environments. The answer to this question is also negative, as we produce an information structure that does not guarantee implementation of efficient decision rules.
